A well-known result (Leivant, 1983) states that, over basic Kalmar elementary arithmetic EA. the induction schema for Z" formulas is equivalent to the uniform reflection principle for Z ,,_I formulas (n> I). We show that fragments of arithmetic axiomatized by various forms of induction rules admit a precise axiomatization in terms of reflection principles as well. Thus, the closure of EA under the induction rule for 1" (or H,+I ) formulas is equivalent to 01 times iterated Z" reflection principle. Moreover, for k < w, k times iterated C reflection principle over EA precisely corresponds to the extension of EA by <k nested applications of Z" induction rule.
Introduction
It is well known that first-order theories can be defined, over first-order logic, by sets of axioms as well as by sets of rules. An axiom can be viewed as a particular kind of rule with an empty, or with some fixed, provable premise. Vice versa, for a theory T axiomatized by rules, all theorems of T constitute a trivial axiomatization of T by a set of axioms. So, if one identifies a theory with its set of theorems -a point of view especially supported by the model-theoretic tradition in logic -there is no essential difference between rules and axioms. This paper is devoted to a detailed proof-theoretic analysis of restricted induction rules in arithmetic. Our main results characterize closures of arithmetical theories containing EA by induction rules in terms of axioms. In contrast with the above observation, we are looking for natural and informative axiomatizations, rather than for easy but useless ones. One difficulty in the way of this project lies in the fact that, in general, the closure of a theory T under a given inference rule R not only depends on R, but on also on T. So, a meaningful characterization of a rule must somehow take into account arbitrary theories T (of a given class). This feature requires a somewhat sharper analysis of induction rules than those existing in the proof-theoretic literature [ 10, 11, 17, 181 , for in all these works the authors dealt with the closures under the induction rules of particular base theories, such as EA or PRA.
Our axiomatizations are formulated in terms of iterated rejection principles; see [20, 141 . Very roughly, k times iterated reflection principle of relevant arithmetical complexity happens to be the strongest formula that can be inferred from a given finite theory (of relevant complexity) using <k nested applications of the induction rule in question. In this sense, our axiomatizations are canonical. In particular, this also allows for general characterizations of the closures of arbitrary extensions of EA under the restricted induction rules. Our characterizations are informative in the sense that they yield several interesting corollaries concerning finite (non)axiomatizability of theories given by induction rules, give wide sufficient conditions for the equivalence of (closures of theories by) n n+i and C,, induction rules, and allow us to give new proofs of several old results, such as the conservativity results for induction schemata over induction rules, characterizations of provably total recursive functions of theories axiomatized by rules, and others.
The rules studied in this paper correspond to natural closure operators on the classes of provably recursive functions of theories, e.g., Ci induction rule precisely corresponds to the primitive recursive closure operator. We also introduce and study a natural version of Ci collection rule, which corresponds to the elementary closure operator.
This rule is especially useful for the analysis of theories, whose classes of provably recursive functions are not elementarily closed. The role of reflection principles in connection with the rules is similar to the role of universal functions for subrecursive classes w.r.t. the above-mentioned closure operators.
For further discussion we must fix some terminology and formulate a few background results.
Kalmar elementary arithmetic EA is a theory known in several equivalent formulations. When formulated in the standard language of Peano arithmetic PA it has the name Ido + EXP and is axiomatized by restricting, in the standard formulation of PA, the schema of induction
A(0) A Vx(A(x) + A(x + 1)) + VxA(x) (1)
to bounded formulas A(x) and by adding a I& axiom stating that the function 2x is total. It is well-known that I& + EXP is a finitely axiomatizable theory [4] .
In an alternative formulation, the language of EA contains function symbols for all Kalmar elementary functions, and mathematical axioms of EA are (1) (open) defining equations for all these functions; and (2) the schema of induction for open formulas. It is known that EA admits a purely universal (or quantifier free) axiomatization in this language. The two formulations of EA are equivalent in the sense that the second theory can be viewed as a conservative 'definitional extension' of the first one.
Let us also mention the fact that there exists a finite, purely universal formulation of EA in a language with symbols for jnitely many elementary functions. This fact is closely related to a well-known theorem, originally due to Rodding, stating that the class of Kalmar elementary functions has a finite basis under composition (see, e.g., [7, 91) . We shall sketch a proof of this useful fact, as well as that of the finite basis theorem, in Section 4.
Our results are invariant w.r.t. the choice of the language of EA, but not all of their proofs are. For definiteness (unless the opposite is obvious from the context) we assume that EA is formulated in the language of PA. It is known that EA is strong enough to reasonably formalize syntax, provability, Godel's incompleteness theorems and partial truth definitions (see [4] ). All theories considered below are assumed to contain EA. By an arithmetical theory we mean a theory formulated in the language of EA. Classes of arithmetical C, and II, formulas are defined in the usual way (cf. p. 13, [4] ). They are invariant w.r.t. the choice of the language of EA (modulo EA-provable equivalence). C. Parsons was probably the first to systematically study fragments of PA obtained by restricting various forms of induction to classes of the arithmetic hierarchy. In [lo, 111, among other things, he showed that, over EA, the induction schema (1) for C, formulas A(x), denoted C,-IA, is strictly stronger than the corresponding induction rule for C, formulas, C,-IR (n > 1):
A(O), 'v'x(A(x) + A(x + 1)) 1 VxA(x).
Parsons demonstrated that many other natural forms of restricted induction over EA are equivalent to one of these two. In particular,
EA + C,-IA = EA + U,-IA (2) (this theory is also often denoted I&) and E/I + C,-IR = EA + II,,+,-IR.
Here the expression T = U means that the theories T and U are deductively equivalent, i.e., have the same set of theorems.
Despite the two results looking very similar, they are rather different in nature, as the reader familiar with their proofs undoubtedly feels. Equivalence (2) actually holds over any theory T containing EA, and this indicates a really tight relationship between the two axiom schemata. On the other hand, it is well-known that equivalence (3) may cease to be true for some theories stronger than EA. For example, I& + C,-IR = ZC, $ ZC, + U2-IR, because 1Zi + I'I2-IR proves the consistency of I&, e.g., by our results in Section 3. This shows that, from some sharper point of view, Zi-IR and n2-IR are substantially difSerent rules. In order to accurately formulate this point of view we adopt a few rather general definitions.
Since the rules we deal with in this paper typically apply to any one from an infinite collection of premises, we say that a rule is a set of instances, that is, expressions of the form A,,...+% B '
where Al,..., A, and B are formulas. Derivations using rules are defined in the standard way; T + R denotes the closure of a theory T under a rule R and first-order logic.
[T, R] denotes the closure of T under unnested applications of R, that is, the theory axiomatized over T by all formulas B such that, for some formulas Al,. . . , A, derivable in T, (Al,..., A,) /B is an instance of R. Definition 1. Let R1 and Rz be rules. RI is reducible to R2 (denoted R1 <R2) iff, for every theory T containing EA, [T,Rl] c [T,Rz] . RI and R2 are congruent (RI 2 R2) iff RI <R2 and Rz<Rl.
Informally, R1 bR2 means that an arbitrary application of RI can be modeled over EA by unnested applications of R2. Notice that < is reflexive and transitive, so that GZ is an equivalence relation. For the purposes of this paper we may safely identify congruent rules.
We say that a rule R is congruent to a set of axioms U, iff R is congruent to U considered as a trivial schematic rule (with the empty premise), or equivalently, iff [T, R] = T + U for any theory T extending EA. Notice that rules congruent to axiom schemata have a trivial behaviour in the sense that they cannot be applied fruitfully more than once: nested applications of such rules do not yield new theorems. Definition 2. RI is derivable from R2 (denoted Rl<Rz), iff for every theory T containing EA, T+RlCT+Rz.
In other words, RI $Rz iff for any application (A,, . . . , A,)/B of RI there exists a derivation of B from Al, . . . ,A, using EA and rule R2. Clearly, RI dR2 implies RI 4R2 but not necessarily vice versa. Below we shall see that equivalences of rules established by purely elementary methods can usually be strengthened to congruences. On the other hand, equivalence proofs involving more sophisticated methods usually depend on the choice of a particular base theory and therefore do not yield reducibilities either in the sense of Definition 1 or 2.
Example. We have seen that fi2-IR+Ci-IR, although the closure of EA under each of these rules is the same. On the other hand, obviously Ci-IR<n2-IR.
Corollary 2.2 in Section 2 shows that II,-IR< C,-IR, for IZ > 1, but not vice versa.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we classify various forms of induction rules modulo congruence relation. We shall show that these rules, most commonly, fall into one of the three distinct categories: (a) rules congruent to induction axiom schemata; (b) rules congruent to C, induction rule C,-IR; (c) rules congruent to Ii', induction rule U,-IR. (An interesting candidate for falling out of this classification is the induction rule for boolean combinations of C,, formulas, which is derivable from, but possibly not reducible to, Z,,-IR for n > 1; see
The question of the axiomatizability of rules of category (a) is trivially settled. So, in the remaining part of the paper we analyze the other two cases. In Section 3 we introduce reflection principles and characterize 17,-IR for IZ 2 1. A similar characterization of C,-IR is more difficult and is given in Section 7 for Ci-IR, and in Section 9 for C,,-IR, n > 1. The characterization of Ci-IR requires a rather careful analysis of provably recursive functions of theories axiomatized by this rule. In Section 4 we recall basic facts about provably recursive functions and formulate an easy characterization of these functions for closures of II2 axiomatized theories by Ci-IR. In Section 5 we analyze the question, when the class of provably recursive functions of a theory is elementarily closed. A natural sufficient condition is formulated in terms of Ci collection rule. In Section 6, on the basis of these results, we construct a suitable universal function for the class of provably recursive functions of a finite II2 axiomatized extension of EA using only unnested applications of Ci-IR over that theory. This allows us to obtain in Section 7 the required characterization of Ci-IR, and subsequently relativize it to .E,-IR for n > 1. It should be said that in the proof of our main results we did not try to be overly laconic. We have included proofs of several results which were formally never used in the main proofs, like a theorem of R. Peter on nested recursion, or the results the use of which could be avoided, like the finite basis theorem for Kalmar elementary functions.
It seems to us that proofs of these easy facts (modulo the rest of our techniques) would enhance the reader's general understanding of peculiar phenomena treated in this paper, so we decided to include them. The results of Section 3 of this paper have been earlier announced in [ 11.
Basic equivalences
C. Parsons showed that many natural forms of induction (of restricted arithmetical complexity) over ,!?A are equivalent to either C,-IR or C,-IA. In this section we obtain a few more results of this kind. We classify various forms of induction rules modulo the sharper congruence relation. Some of Parsons' equivalences then turn out to be congruences, whereas some others do not. We also examine a few rules that have not been considered by Parsons. In addition to IR we consider the following forms of induction rule:
As usual, for r a class of arithmetical formulas, r-I&, T-IR<, and T-LR will denote the above rules with the restriction that A t r. We also assume that formulas A(x) may contain free parameters other than x. Everywhere below, whenever we talk about C,, or U, induction rules or axioms, it will be implicitly assumed that n b 1. Proposition 2.1. C,,-IRO S n,-IR, g C,-IR.
Proof.
(1) The congruence Z,-I& 2 ZI,-I& is proved in analogy with the proof of the equivalence of C,- IA and I?, . For example, to show that C,-I& < ZI,-I&, consider a formula A(x) E C,, such that
Then for B(a,x) := 1A(alx) one has
Notice that a similar trick does not work with the rule IR. 
where A(x) := 3~ Ag (x, u) , Ag(x, u) 
Here (z)~ denotes the yth element of a sequence coded by z, the standard coding function being Kalmar elementary. Clearly, B(x) E C,, and from (4) one readily obtains
Applying Z,-IR once, we get Vx B(x) and Vxk3y Ag (x, u) . 0
Now we examine some rules congruent to axiom schemata. The effect of such rules over a theory T is precisely that of adding to T a fixed amount of axioms (that do not depend on T). This idea is spelled out in the following definition.
Definition 3.
A rule R is congruent to a set of formulas U (denoted R " Cl) iff, for
every theory T containing EA, [T, R] = T + U.
It is not difficult to see that, if R 2 U, then we have
[[T,R],R] = [T,R] + U = (T + U) + U = T + U = [T,R],
and so, such a rule can nontrivially be applied only once. Also notice that in order to demonstrate R " U it is enough to check that [EA, R] contains U and that T + U is closed under R for every theory T.
Of the rules congruent to axiom schemes the most obvious one is the usual Gentzenstyle rule of induction, which can also be called 'the induction rule with side formulas'.
In Hilbert-style formulation it may look, e.g., as follows:
It is well-known that, whenever the complexity of the formula A is restricted to, say, C,, this rule provides an alternative axiomatization of I& (over EA). Moreover, the reader may easily check that to derive an instance of C,-IA only one application of the rule is necessary. On the other hand, the fact that T + C,-IA is closed under the induction rule with side formulas is obvious, hence the rule is congruent to C,-IA. Of course, such an effect is only possible because no restriction was imposed on the arithmetical complexity of the 'side formula' B. Our further examples are of a somewhat more delicate nature.
Recall that, for a class of arithmetical formulas r, da(r)-formulas are those obtained from r by means of boolean connectives and bounded quantifiers. Parsons [ 1 l] essentially proved the following fact. 
Proof.
To derive an instance of C,-IA apply IR to the following da(&) formula:
To show that T + Z,-IA is closed under do(&)-IR for each theory T notice that an even stronger fact is known:
The above proposition has a somewhat paradoxical consequence that Ao(.& )-IR turns out to be actually stronger than fl2-IR over EA. This looks strange because we all are used to the fact that in the standard model of arithmetic da (&) For this q, using only elementary induction we can find the minimal x such that q(x)= 1. It coincides with the least x such that A(x) holds since q is the x-piece of A.
(2) To demonstrate the second congruence it is sufficient to show that every Z7, formula is piecewise coded in [EA, &LR] . Let VuAg (u,x) be such a formula, with A0 E Zn_ 1. Following the same idea as before, and taking for q the function identically equal to 1, we obtain EA t-3q 3u b 'x'xba (Ao((uh,x) 
Using C,,-LR take the least such q (and a corresponding u). In order to see that q is as required reason, for any x <a, as follows: (z,x) , then Ao ((uX,x) and hence q(x) = 1. l If lzlAo (z,x) and q(x) = 1, pick any such z and define a sequence u' and a function q' as follows: (u')i = (u)i, for i #x, (u')~ = Z; and q'(i) = q(i), for i # x, q'(x) = 0. Then q' has a smaller code than q and satisfies Obviously,
EA t-3x (A(a) + A(x)).
Using Proposition A priori, we can only say that
and that at least one of the two inequalities is strict. In the preliminary version of this paper [2] we gave an elementary, although somewhat lengthy, argument showing that W(C,)-IR is derivable from C,-IR. This result can be simplified and somewhat strengthened using more advanced methods. In particular, now we are able to show that 93(Ci )-IR and Zi-IR are congruent, although it remains open whether this holds for n > 1. We shall treat &?(Ci )-IR more carefully in Section 10 at the end of the paper.
We summarize the structure of induction rules modulo reducibility (and derivability) relation in the following diagram.
In addition to the already established facts, we remark that neither of the rules n n+i-IR and C,-IA is derivable from the other, so that all the reducibilities shown on the diagram are proper. Indeed, over EA Z,-IA is strictly stronger than II,+,-IR (see the proof of Corollary 2.2) whereas over I&, the latter is stronger than the former, e.g., by Theorem 1 formulated in the next section.
ZI,, induction rule
In this section we give a characterization of 17,-IR in terms of iterated reflection principles.
Rejection principles, for an r.e. theory T, are formal schemata expressing the soundness of T, that is, the statement that 'every sentence provable in T is true'. More precisely, if Provr(x) denotes a canonical Zi provability predicate for T, then the (uniform) reflection principle for T is the schema
for all formulas A(x). This schema is denoted RFN(T). Partial reflection principles are obtained from it by imposing a restriction that the formula A may only range over a certain subclass r of the class of T-formulas. Such schemata will be denoted RFNr( T), and for r one usually takes one of the classes C,, or II,, of the arithmetical hierarchy. The following two basic facts on uniform reflection principles are well-known (cf. [20] ) and easy:
(1) RFNr,,( T) is equivalent to RFNn,,+,( T) over EA, for n 2 1. RFNn, (T) is equivalent to Con(T), the consistency assertion for T. (2) The schema RFNn,,(T) is equivalent to a single II,, sentence (over EA). This follows from the existence of partial truthdefinitions.
An old and well-known result of Kreisel and Levy [5] 
Partial truth definitions:
There is a II,, formula Truen,j(x), which adequately expresses the predicate 'x is a Godel number of a true n, sentence' in EA. 2 This means that Truen,,(x) is well defined on atomic formulas and provably in EA commutes with boolean connectives and quantifiers, i.e., satisfies Tarski conditions for II,, formulas.
As a result, for any A(x) E l&, we have
For our proof it will be essential that Tarski conditions not only hold locally, for each individual n, formula, but also uniformly. In other words, EA proves that, for all $, $, 0, a, y such that c#I, $, CI, 'dxy(x), 3xa(x) are II, sentences, (x0, . . . ,x,) ) = t(xo, . . . ,xn).
' We assume in this section that the class of II, formulas contains not only those literally in Il, form, but also the ones obtained from prenex l7, formulas using V,A, and universal quantification.
Usually, eval(u,x) is explicitly used in the construction of a truthdefinition for the evaluation of atomic formulas. This implies that the truthdefinition and the evaluation of terms agree in the sense that EA proves that for all l7, formulas @(xg, . . _ ,x,) and
and similarly for terms ti in more than one free variable. We refer the reader to [4] for an elaboration of all the above claims.
Proof of Theorem 1. [7', ZZ,-IR] is the theory axiomatized over T by all formulas
VxZ(x) such that Z(x) E ZZ,, and T proves
Therefore, first we must show that, for any such Z(x), there is a finite &+I axiomatized subtheory TO 5 T such that
T + FWNn,,(To) k b'xZ(x).
For the axioms of TO we simply take the ZZ,+i formula (8) together with all axioms of EA. Obviously, for every n we have TO k Z(n). Furthermore, formalizing this fact in EA we obtain
This implies VxZ(x) by To-reflection.
Now we must show that
for any finite ZZ,+r axiomatized subtheory TO C T. Without loss of generality, we may assume that T itself is a finite ZZ,+t axiomatized extension of EA. Furthermore, we may assume that the single nonlogical axiom of T has the form Vxc . . . Vxmx(xo,. . . , x,,,), where c( is a ZZ,, formula. In particular, this formula accumulates all (finitely many) equality axioms in our language and a finite ZZz axiomatization of EA. Consider a cut-free derivation of a sequent of the form 3x0 . . . 3xn a, Il, where ZZ is a set of ZZ, formulas. By the subformula property, any formula occurring in this derivation either(a)hastheform3x~...3x,C((tO,...,t~_,,x~,...,x,),forsomeO~k~mandterms to,. . . , t&l, or (b) is a ZZ, formula. Now let Z,(m) be a ZZ,, formula naturally expressing the following:
'For all p, if p is a cut-free derivation of a sequent of the form Z, n(a), where Z is a set formulas of type (a) above, n(a) is a set of ZZ,, formulas, where a stands for all the free variables in ZZ, and if the height of p is < m, then Vx Truen,,('V n(i)').
Lemma 3.1. T k IT(O) A Vm (IT(~) + Ir(m + 1)).

Proof. We reason informally within T. IT(O) trivially holds. We show that IT(~)
implies I~(rn + 1). Thus, we are given a cut-free derivation of height m + 1, of a sequent of the form r, ll, where r and Ll are as above, and we must show that the disjunction of I7 is True, in the sense of Truen,,, under every substitution of numerals for free variables in IZ. For the rest of the proof we fix an arbitrary substitution of this kind and treat ZI as if it were a set of sentences. We distinguish several cases, according to the form of the last rule applied in the given derivation.
Case 1: The sequent c ll is a logical axiom, that is, it has the form A, 4, -4 for some atomic 4. Since all the formulas of type (a) contain at least one existential quantifier and therefore are neither atomic nor negated atomic, both 4 and lb must belong to 17. Tarski commutation conditions then imply that
so we obtain Truen<l ('41) V Truen,, ('-$l) and hence Truea, ('V II'). Case 2: The sequent c Il is obtained by a rule introducing a boolean connective or a quantifier into a formula from n. All these rules are treated similarly using the subformula property of cut-free derivations and Tarski commutation conditions for Truen,,. For example, the rule for the universal quantifier has the form where a is not free in r, n'. We must show that the formula V fI' VVxc#~(x) is True. By the induction hypothesis, since a does not occur free in IZ', we know that, for each x, V L"Vcj(i) is True. Commuting Truea? with the small disjunction we conclude that, for each x, either V L" or 4(X) is True. Since n', and also Truen,,( 'U'l), do not depend on x, it follows that either 17' is True, or for every x, 4(X) is True. Commuting Trueg, with the universal quantifier and then backwards with the disjunction we conclude that n' V b'x4(x) is True. 0
In the next case we shall be more explicit about parameters.
Case 3: The last rule introduces the existential quantifier in front of ol, i.e., our derivation has the form
A free variable a here stands for all the parameters on which 17 and the terms tj may depend. So, the induction hypothesis is applicable and implies that, for all x, either the disjunction of n(x), or a(t&), . . . , tm(X)) is True. We must, reasoning inside T, refute the second alternative.
Notice that, although, in general, ti are 'nonstandard' terms, CI is a fixed 'standard' II ,,+I formula. Therefore Tarski's commutation lemma (6) can be applied to tl, after evaluating the term t. Thus, by (7) and (6) we obtain
Since the evaluation function is provably total in EA, it follows that
, that is, yields a contradiction in T. Thus, we see that, for any to, . . . , tm and x, the formula tx(to(X), . . , t,(f)) cannot be True, hence the disjunction of II(Z) is True. Case 4: c II is obtained by a rule introducing any other existential quantifier into a formula from r. Then our claim follows immediately from the induction hypothesis, because the Xl part of the premise in this case is the same as that of the conclusion. 0
An immediate corollary of the above lemma is that
Notice that for T containing EA and n B 2, obviously,
[T, II,-IR] t-SUPEXP.
On the other hand, it is well known (cf. [4] ) that Ido + SUPEXP is a strong enough theory to prove the Cut-elimination Theorem for first-order logic. In order to derive
RFNn,,(T) we reason inside [T,IZ,-IR], for every particular fl, formula A(x), as follows. Suppose Provr('A(i)l).
Then the sequent 3x0 . . . 3x,,, ct(xg, . . . ,x,) , A(f) is logically provable. By (formalized) cut-elimination theorem we obtain a cut-free proof of this sequent, and by (9) conclude that Truen,,( 'A(i)') holds. Tarski commutation lemma (6) then yields A(x). 0 The rest of this section is devoted to various remarks, corollaries and comments concerning Theorem 1. Let, for a fixed n 2 1, (TX denote the sequence of theories based on iteration of the H, reflection principle over T:
(T);; e r, (TX,, = (TX + Rf%,((T);h (T)", = U (TX.
Similarly, [T, nn-IR] k is defined by repeated application of II,-IR:
We obviously have The 'horizontal' conservation results are due to Parsons and Schmerl, and the 'vertical' equivalences are Leivant's and ours (Corollary 3.2 ).
An interesting particular case of Theorem 1 concerns the induction rule for Zi'i formulas. It is well-known that the uniform reflection principle for ZZi formulas for a theory T is equivalent to consistency assertion for T, Con(T). So, Corollary 3.2 can be reformulated as follows.
Corollary 3.5. For finite II2 axiomatized theories T containing Ido + SUPEXP,
T -t nl-IR = T + Con( 7') + Con(Con(T)) + . .
Clearly, for a sound theory T, T + ni-IR is an extension of T by true ZIt axioms, and hence both T and T + ni-IR have the same class of provably recursive functions.
Despite that, T + 171-IR is stronger than T and the equivalence (10) gives us a precise measure of its relative strength. Wilkie and Paris [21] . In this situation the family of consistency assertions w.r.t. proofs of bounded cut-rank Conk(T), k 2 0, plays the role of the single consistency assertion Con(T) for T. Since EA is a strong enough theory to prove Cut-elimination Theorem for derivations of bounded cut-rank, a quick inspection of the given proof of Theorem 1 yields the following result: for T containing EA, [T, ni-IR] is equivalent to T together with all Conk(U) such that k 80 and U is a finite lI2 axiomatized subtheory of T.
Our next goal is the characterization of C,, induction rule in the spirit of Theorem 1.
Parsons showed that C,-IR is equivalent to n,+l-IR over EA. However, the two rules are not congruent and so, a more careful analysis is needed here. Let me explain why the simple proof of Theorem 1 cannot be easily adapted to the C, case.
The technical reason is that the formula 1r(m) in that proof involves a number of outer universal quantifiers, and therefore does not have the required C,, form. Some of these quantifiers, e.g., the quantifier over all derivations p, can actually be bounded. One can replace the induction on the height m of a proof by IR, over Giidel numbers p of proofs using the fact that, under the standard coding, subderivations of p have smaller Giidel numbers. However, there does not seem to be an easy way to get rid of the quantifier over all substitutions of numerals for free variables in the end-sequent.
4 Lemma 2.1.4 is true, but it is not difficult to see that the schema of 'restricted primitive recursion' dealt with there is actually equivalent to the unrestricted primitive recursion. So, the proof-theoretic analysis in this lemma, as it is formulated, gives us no more information about the strength of I7l-IR than the reduction of I7,-IR to Z,-IR.
The only possibility here seems to be to keep those variables free, as the parameters of the formula 1,. Yet, this possibility is blocked by the simple fact that some sequents in the proof p may contain many more parameters than the end-sequent, and we ought to take them all into account. There is one rare situation where this difficulty does not arise: simply, if there are no universal quantifiers in the end-sequent. This idea allows us to analyze the Cr induction rule. Then, by skolemization, we will be able to pull the result up in the arithmetical hierarchy. This project is carefully elaborated in the remaining part of the paper.
Provably recursive functions
In this section we recall some basic facts about provably (total) recursive functions (p.t.r.fs) of theories and characterize these functions for closures of theories under Cr induction rule. Most of these results are folklore or close to be so.
We shall deal with various classes of number-theoretic functions. The basic class is the class of elementary functions 6'. For a class K, C(K) denotes the closure of
denotes the closure of KU E under composition and one application of primitive recursion, i.e., the class C(F), where F is the set of all functions f(n, a) definable by a schema of the form 
Definition 4. A number-theoretic function f(x) is called provably recursive in a theory
T iff the graph of f can be represented by a Z;I formula t&x, y) such that
TkVxX!y$(x,y).
The class of p.t.r.fs of a theory T is denoted S(T).
It is easy to see that graphs of p.t.r.fs are actually Al in T. The class 9(T) is closed under composition, but not necessarily elementarily closed, even if T contains EA. This creates for us some additional difficulties, since proof-theoretically it is much more common and pleasant to deal with elementarily closed classes of functions. Sometimes one considers p.t.r.fs with elementary graphs, that is, with the formula $(x, y) elementary. 5 These classes of functions are closed under bounded minimization, but not under composition. However, the following obvious proposition holds. Proof. Let $(x, y) := 3z $o(z,x, y), where $0 is elementary, define the graph of f, so that
T k Vxk3!y $(x, y).
Using the standard pairing function we let
Then it is not difficult to check that 4 defines a certain p.t.r.f g in T, 4 is elementary, and for all n, f(n) = (g(n)), . 0
Since 9(T) only depends on the II2 fragment of T, we shall concentrate our attention on II2 axiomatized theories. holds in the standard model of arithmetic.
Every true II, sentence has a witness. The function fn(x) whose graph is defined by the formula 4(x, y) A Vz < y + (x,2) is called the standard witness of 7c.
Proposition 4.2. Let T be a jinite II2 axiomatized sound extension of EA, and let f be the standard witness of the single axiom of T. Then ?B( T) = C( f ).
Proof. Obviously, f is a p.t.r.f in T, and so C(f) C 23(T). The opposite inclusion is, more or less, a direct consequence of Herbrand's Theorem. Consider a purely universal formulation of EA (in a language with symbols for all Kalmar elementary functions), and add to this language a new function symbol f together with the axiom
where Vx'x3.y 4(x, y) is the single axiom of T over EA. Using appropriate Kalmar elementary terms we can get rid of all bounded quantifiers in (6. Hence, the resulting theory is a conservative extension of T and has a purely universal axiomatization. Now suppose T k Vx3! y 3z& (x, y,z) , where $0 is elementary (and in our formulation also quantifier-free).
Since T has a purely universal axiomatization, by Herbrand's theorem we obtain terms tl,. . . , tk, ~1,. . . , uk of the extended language such that . . v $o(a, tk(ah uk(a) Clearly, the terms ti and Ui represent functions in C(f). Now we let
and ~&(X,ti(X),Ui(X)) for all i < k, otherwise.
defined in a similar manner, with ui's in place of ti's. Since the x if z=O, y ifz#O is elementary, the class C(f) is closed under definitions by cases and so, t(x) and u(x) can be adequately defined by C(f)
terms. For these terms we obviously have Proof. Follows from the previous proposition and the fact that d has a finite basis (cf, e.g., [7, 91) . It might be interesting for the reader to notice that, if we had been slightly more careful in the proof of Proposition 4.2, we could actually have inferred the existence of a finite basis in 6' from finite axiomatizability of EA.
T k $o(a, t(u), u(a)).
Consider a finite Zi'z axiomatization of EA in the usual language of arithmetic (see [4] Proof. Let g(n,x) be defined by a schema of primitive recursion
such that e, h E C(f ). Since all functions in C(f) are p.t.r.f in T, graphs of e and h are defined by Ct formulas E(x, y) and H (z, n, x, y) := 30 Ho(u, z, n, x, y) , with HO elementary.
The graph of g is most naturally defined (in the standard model) by the following formula (that uses elementary coding of sequences):
g(n,x) = y :* 3~ E Seq ((s)o = e(x) A Vi < n (s)i+l = h((s)i, i,x) A (s), = y).
However, in absense of Cl collection principle this formula may not be equivalent to a Ct formula within T. We modify it as follows (a somewhat similar trick was employed earlier in the proof of Proposition 2.3): g(n,x) = y :
This formula is obviously Ci, and now we shall show the totality of g in [T, Ci-IR] . Clearly, T k 3y g(O,x) = y, because e(x) is provably total. In order to see that we argue informally as follows. Suppose g(n,x) = y and thus we are given two sequences s and u of length n + 1 satisfying (11). We have to construct appropriate sequences of length n + 2. Since the function h is provably total, we can find a z such that h(y,n,x) =z. Hence there is a w such that Ho(w, y,n,x,z) holds. Pick any such w and add the element z to the end of the sequence s, and w to the end of v. The resulting sequences are as required. Applying Ct-IR we obtain
To prove the functionality of g we reason as follows. Let R (n,s, u,x, y) denote the elementary part of the formula (1 1 ), and suppose we have R(n,sl, 01 ,x, yt ) and R (n,s2,~2,x,y2) . We prove Vi<n (sl)i=(sz)i by induction on i (with n,sj,vj,x,yj as free parameters). Notice that the induction is elementary, although it is applied as a schema rather than as a rule here. Basis and induction step follow at once from the functionality of e and h. So we obtain (si )n = (sz)~, and therefore yi = ~2. Notice that the argument for the functionality was actually carried out in T. Consider an arbitrary elementary formula ,4(x, y, a) such that T t-3YA(o,Y,a), Tl-Vx(3yA(x,y,u)+ 3yA(x+ l,y,a)).
By Proposition 4.2 we obtain functions e(a) and h(y,x, a) in C(f) such that e witnesses VZlyA(0, y, a), and h witnesses Consider a primitive recursion do, a) = e(a),
Straightforward induction on x then shows that A(x,g(x,u),u) holds in the standard model for all x and a. This means that g(x, a) witnesses Vx,&ly ,4(x, y, a). 0 Proof. We only have to notice that for such theories T, 9([T, is properly contained in the class of all primitive recursive functions. 0
Elementary closure
As we have noted before, the class 9(T) need not be elementarily closed even if the theory T contains EA. In this section we shall investigate this question in more detail and formulate sufficient conditions for 9(T) to be elementarily closed. A version of the following proposition can be found in [9] with a more complicated proof. for a certain term b(x, y) E C(T). We only need to ensure that the value of b(x, y) is greater than all values t(i, y) for i<x, where terms t occur in the context j(t) within g. Notice that f is an increasing function. Therefore, we can majorize each t(x,y) by an increasing function in C(f) and take the sum of all these functions as b(x,y). 0
Notice that the previous proposition can be generalized to E(fi, . . , fn) = w,,..., fn) either by encoding ft,. . . , fn into a single function using the pairing and projection mechanism, or just by generalizing the proof of Proposition 5.1.
Proposition 5.2. If f(x) is increasing and the graph off is elementary, then 7 E C(f) and therefore C( f ) = E( f ).
Proof. If f is increasing, for a certain elementary function b we have
because the code of a sequence can be estimated elementarily in its length and the largest element (= f (n)). 0 If (n+ l)~ >O, then
(The standard pairing function (x, y) is monotonic in both arguments.) On the other hand, if (n + 1 )O = 0 then, obviously, fi (n + 1) = g((n + 1 )I ). It follows that 7, can be defined by the following primitive recursion:
Here * denotes the operation of adjoining an element at the end of a sequence.
•i
Now we turn to proof-theoretic analogs of the above lemmas.
Definition 6. Let rc be a IZ2 sentence. TT is monotonic, if there is an elementary formula
4(x, y) such that EA proves that
= c, VX'x3Y 4(x, Y),
4(x, y) A 4(x, z) + Y = z, 3. ~(~l,y)A~(X2,~)AXI~X2-'Y~Z.
Informally, rc is monotonic iff it is equivalent to a sentence whose only witness is provably increasing. 
T is closed under Cl collection rule:
C, -CR Vx3 y 4(x, y) k k'x'x3 yV'u 6x3~ <y&u, v),
Proof. Clearly, the formula Vx3yV'u 6x3~ d y4(u, V) implies Vx3y 4(x, y) in EA and is monotonic, whenever q5 is elementary. So, we may apply Ci collection rule to all axioms of T and obtain a monotonic axiomatization.
In order to show that Statement 1 implies 2 we take an axiomatization of T over EA by II2 formulas whose standard witnesses are monotonic. Then we introduce Skolem functions for all these formulas and replace axioms rr := Vx3y4(x,y) of T by their skolemizations 'dx 4(x, fn(x)). The resulting theory T* proves monotonicity of all these functions fK:
Besides, it is conservative over T, and has a purely universal axiomatization (if EA is taken in a universal formulation). Now assume T 1 b'x3y $(x, y) for a formula $ E Ci. By Herbrand's theorem we can obtain a monotonic term t(x) in the extended language such that
T* t-t'x'x3y <t(x) $(x, y).
(This actually is a version of Par&h's theorem for T* (cf. [4, p. 2721 ). Here we use the fact that every elementary function can be majorized by an increasing one, and hence any term in the extended language can.) Provable monotonicity of t(x) then implies
T* ~VX~~=~(,)~'U~X~U~~~(U,U).
The result follows by conservativity of T* over T. 0
Corollary 5.5. A II2 sentence Vx3y4(x,y) is monotonic ifs
EA b Vx3y 4(x, y) + Vx3yVu <x3 d y$(u, u).
Corollary 5.6. For a sound II2 axiomatized theory T containing EA,
[T,C,-CR] = T + C,-CR, 2. 9( T + C,-CR) = E(9(T)).
Proof. Part 1 follows from the fact that, for a II2 axiomatized theory T, [T, Cl -CR] can be axiomatized by monotonic I72 sentences. The inclusion 9( T + Cl-CR) > E(9( T))
follows from the fact that T + Cl-CR is axiomatizable by a set of monotonic Z72 sentences, whose witnessing functions are increasing and have elementary graphs, so Finally, we formulate a technically very useful proposition that also relies on monotonicity properties of functions and states, roughly, that for a provably increasing function f the induction schema for formulas elementary in f is reducible to the induction schema for formulas elementary in the graph of f. This fact is essentially due to Gaifman and Dimitracopoulos [3] . A somewhat weaker version can be found in [4, Proposition 1.3, p. 2711 and we follow the idea of these proofs very closely.
Let do(f) denote the class of bounded formulas in the language of EA (with symbols for all elementary functions) enriched by a function symbol f(x), where, in particular, f may occur in bounding terms. Let F(x, y) denote the formula f(n) = y defining the graph of f. do(F) formulas are those built up from F(x, y) and elementary ones using boolean connectives and quantifiers bounded by elementary functions. Finally, let T be the theory in the above language obtained by adding to all axioms of EA the axiom
%Y(XG.Y + f(x)Gf(y))
asserting the monotonicity of f.
Proposition 5.11. Over the theory T the induction schemata for Ao( f) formulas and do(F) formulas are deductively equivalent.
Proof. First of all, notice that any term t in the language of T can be provably majorized by a term provably increasing in each variable (because every elementary function is majorizable by a monotonic one). We fix one such term for every term t and call it 1. applies in the case when the function g has more than one 
Lemma 5.12. For every term s(Z) there is a monotonic term t(d) and a do(F) formula $(a', b, y) such that T I-'v'y > t(Z) (s(Z) = b ++ I,@, b, y)).
Proof
Lemma 5.13. For every do(f) formula $(Z) there is a do(F) formula ll/o(Z, ye, . . , y,,) and provably monotonic terms tl (Z), tz(Z,
whenever yi 2 si(ii, U, yt , . . . , yi_ 1) for all 1 < i <n. Besides, by Lemma 5.12 we obtain a monotonic term r(Z,~u) and a da(F) formula r(Z,u,z) such that r(Z, U,Z) ++ U <s(Z)
for z>r(Z,r4).
We introduce two fresh variables, y,+l and yn+2, and let &(a', yt,. . . , yn+2) be defined as follows:
We also let for i<n, and let &+t(Z,yr ,..., y,,) := s"(Z), and &+@,yt,.. .,y,,+t) := r(ii,y,+t). In order to see that the claim of our lemma holds, that is, that formula (14) is provably equivalent to V'u<s(Z) $(ii,u) for yi sufficiently large w.r.t. each other, we first notice that u < yn+l implies r(S, U) < r(ii, yn+t ) < yn+2 by provable monotonicity of the term r and by the choice of y,,+z. It follows that, under these assumptions, ~(a', U, yn+2) is equivalent to u <~(a'), which implies u <s"(Z), and by monotonicity of terms si for any such u we have It follows that the induction hypothesis is applicable and yields (13). From this it is easy to conclude that formula (12) implies (14). The opposite implication is proved in a similar way. 0
To complete the proof of Proposition 5.11 we prove do(J) induction in the form of the least number principle I++, a') + 3x' <x (lj(x', a')AVz < x' +z, a-))
for an arbitrary dc( f) formula $(x, Fi). We apply Lemma 5.13 to II/ and reason inside T plus da(F) induction as follows.
Assume $(x, a') and that yi , . . . , yn satisfy the premise of the implication in Lemma 5.13, so that we may infer &-,(x,Z,~) from Ii/(x, a') (notice that some such yi, . . , yn provably exist). Applying the least element principle for $0 (variables ; as well as a' act as free parameters) we obtain an x' <x such that Now we notice that, by monotonicity of terms ti, for all i <n we have and so the premise of the implication in Lemma 5.13 is satisfied for x', as well as for any z < x' (for the same reason). It follows that x' is, indeed, the least number satisfying 4(x, Z). 0
Remark 5.14. Notice that we have actually reduced do(f) induction to the one for do(F) formulas whose bounding terms are plain variables.
Evaluation
The aim of this section is to show that the universal function for the class of p.t.r.fs of a finite D2 axiomatized theory T belongs to [9(T) , PR], and therefore can be represented in [T, Ci-IR]. As a by-product we obtain a new and very transparent proof of a theorem of Peter (cf. [ 121 and also [13] ) stating that so-called nested recursion on o is reducible to primitive recursion.
Let f(x) be a function. Every function of the class C(f) can be represented by a term in a language containing a function symbol for f and finitely many function symbols for a certain basis in 8 (cf. Proposition 4.4) . We call these functions initial functions, and the terms of this language will be called f-terms. We fix a natural elementary Gijdel numbering of f-terms.
The evaluation function evalf(e,x) for f-terms is defined as follows:
evalf ( for some f-terms go(a) and h(x, y, a). We shall express g(n, a) in the form
for a function s(n) to be found. Let num(n) denote the index of a constant f-term with value n, and let Sub,,(e,i,j) compute the index of an f-term that results in simultaneous substitution of f-terms i and j for variables x and y respectively in an f-term e. It is easy to see that functions Sub and num are elementary. Then we can define s(n) as follows:
By induction on n one easily shows that s(n) is a Giidel number of an f-term t, (u) such that t,,(u) = g(n,u) for all a. Hence eval,-(s(n), (u)) = g(n,u) for all a and n. So, it only remains to prove that primitive recursion (16) ISubJe,i,j)l <C. 14 maxtlil, Ijl>, because the total number of occurrences of variables x and y in a term e is less than ]eJ. On the other hand, the length of num(n) is at worst linear in n. So, for large enough n we have Is(n + l)l <Cl . Is(n Another interesting corollary is the reduction of nested recursion to primitive recursion. A nested recursive definition may have, e.g., the following form:
do, a> = so(a), s(n + La> = ho(g(n,hl(g(n,a),a)),n,a).
In general, one allows arbitrarily deep nestings of g-terms on the right-hand side of the definition, but g must only occur in the context g(n, .), that is, the first argument must always be n. An old result of Peter says that nested recursion is reducible to primitive recursion, and it is relevant for our work as follows.
Suppose we want to evaluate a term t(u(x)), where t and u are complex terms. Doing this in the most straightforward manner we must first evaluate u and then t, that is, evalf('t(u)l,x) = evalf( rtl, evalf( rul, (x))).
We see that evalf occurs doubly nested on the right-hand side of the equation. The evaluation procedure prescribed by Proposition 6.1 is different: we look at the terms t and u as being decomposed into initial functions, and evaluate only one function at a step. This is a longer process, although it yields the same result.
A natural rule to verify the totality of functions defined by nested recursion is II2 induction rule, rather than Cl-IR, which only works for primitive recursive definitions on the face of it. 6 Therefore, it is not surprising that Peter's theorem is an essential element in Parsons' proof of the equivalence of II2 and Ct induction rules. Here we obtain a slightly sharpened version of Peter's result for free. Proof. Without loss of generality we may assume that K has the form C(f). Now we almost literally follow the lines of the proof of the second part of Proposition 6.1. A function g(n, a) defined by nested recursion from C(f) can be expressed in the form 6A recently introduced 'Logic of Primitive Recursion' by Sieg and Wainer [19] seems to provide a relevant framework for the analysis of the intensional phenomenon of correspondence between rules and computational schemes.
evalf(s(n),a)
for a suitable elementary function s. The bound on the rate of growth of s, however, will be slightly worse than before. For sufficiently large n we have where k is the maximum depth of nestings in the definition of g. However, this means that s grows no faster than triply exponentially. 0
Let T be finite II2 axiomatized extension of EA and let f be the standard witness for the single axiom of T. Recall that the graph of f is defined by an elementary formula. We shall show that the evaluation function for f-terms can be naturally represented in [T, Cl -IR] , and that its basic properties are provable in this theory.
Without loss of generality we may assume that T is formulated in a language containing function symbols for f and for finitely many initial elementary functions. By Propositions 4.6 and 6.1 we know that evalf is provably recursive in [T, Ci-IR], and hence its graph can be represented by a certain Ci formula. This formula can be read off from the primitive recursive definition of evalf, or rather evalf, using the formalization of primitive recursion (11) in the proof of Proposition 4.6. The following somewhat sharper observation will be essential for us below. Proof. This is a particular instance of Proposition 4.6. For the definition given in Lemma 6.5, the totality of evalf can be directly verified using one application of the rule Ci-IR,, which is congruent to Ci-IR. The functionality of evab is established within T as in the proof of Proposition 4.6. 0 A corollary of this lemma is that a function symbol for evalf, and therefore the one for evalf, can be introduced within [T,Ci-IR] . Since the definitions of evak and evalf are natural, recursive clauses l-3 from the proof of Proposition 6.1 are provable in [T, Ci-IR], and we obtain the following statement.
Lemma 6.7. [r, Cl -IR] proves
1. 'e codes ith variable' + evalf(e,x) = (x)i; 2. A:=, 'ei codes a term' -+ evalf (Sub,...,,~('hl,eo ,..., e,),x) = h(evalf(eo,x), . ..) evalf(e,,x)), for any initial function /2(x0,. . .,x,).
The following corollary is standard.
Proposition 6.8. For any f-term t(xo,. . ,xn),
Proof. By external induction on the build-up of t. 0
To be able to more fruitfully use the inductive clauses for evalf we need a reasonable amount of induction for formulas involving evalf. Proof. Recall that evalf was defined via the function evalf. We observe two things: Proof. Exactly as in the proof of Theorem 1 we can show that, if for I(x) E Ci the theory T proves
then for a suitable finite I& axiomatized subtheory TO of T one has
T + FWNZ,(To) I-VxZ(x).
(For the axioms of TO one may take formula (17) together with all axioms of EA.)
For the opposite inclusion it is sufficient to demonstrate that for finite n2 axiomatized theories T. Modulo the work we have done in the previous sections the argument will be similar to the one in [17, Theorems 3.2 and 3.3.1
We introduce a function symbol f for the standard witness for the single axiom of T and finitely many symbols for a suitable basis in 6, so that T attains a purely universal axiomatization. It is also essential that the language of T is finite, and that T has only finitely many nonlogical axioms in the extended language.
We know that [T, Cl -IR] has a reasonable evaluation function evalf for terms in the language of T. Using evalf first we manufacture a satisfaction predicate for quantifier free formuals of T. The following lemma is well-known and easy. We also notice the following useful property of the function trm that can be seen from our proof of Lemma 7.1: for every open formula #(zo,. . . ,z,) and any terms to,. . . , t,, we have trW&to,.
. ,tn>'> = Subz,...z,,(td'$'), 'to',. . ., 'tn').
This property is formalizable in EA and yields the following fact: [T, Ci-IR] proves that for all formulas $(zo,. . . ,z,) and any terms to,. . , t,,
This essentially follows from (19) and Corollary 6.10.
Now let VXO . . . Vx,,,-m(x~, . . . ,x,) be the single nonlogical axiom of T (accumulating, in particular, all the equality axioms), with M quantifier free. Consider a cut-free derivation of a sequent of the form 3x0 . . .3x, a(x0,. . , xm), A, where A is a set of quantifierfree formulas. By the subformula property, any formula occurring in this derivation either (a) has the form 3xk...3x,,, a (& ,..., tk_l,xk ,..., x,) , for some O<k<m and terms to,. . . , tk_ 1, or (b) is an open formula. Furthermore, since the rule introducing a universal quantifier is never applied, without loss of generality we may assume that the derivation contains no free variables apart from those of A (otherwise, substitute 0 for any such variable everywhere in the proof). Let us call a cut-free derivation satisfying these conditions normal.
Lemma 7.3. The theory [T, Cl -IR] proves the uniform rejection principle for quantifier free formulas of T w.r. t. normal provability, that is, the following statement:
If a sequent of the form r, A, where A consists of open formulas in the language of T and r is a set of formulas of type (a) above, has a normal proof, then for all n, Satf(rV Al,n).
Proof. The argument is similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 1 and, in fact, easier, although there are some subtle formal differences. Reasoning inside [T, Cl -IR] we fix an arbitrary substitution of numerals E for free variables of A everywhere in the given normal derivation and obtain a derivation p of a sequent of the form r(E), A(Z). By the normality, any subderivation q of p has a similar form, and its Gijdel number is smaller than p. By induction on the height h of q we prove the following statement:
For all h,q, if q is a subderivation of p of height h and the end sequent of (*) q has the form r', A', where r' is of type (a) and A' is quantifier free, then Sat#V A", ()).
Since there are only finitely many subderivations of p, the quantifier over all q in this statement is bounded, and p appears as a free variable. So, the whole induction is an instance of dc (eva!,) induction schema, which is available in [Z',Zi-IR] by Proposition 6.9.
As usual, we consider several cases according to the last rule applied in the subderivation q. The cases of logical axioms and rules of propositional logic are easily treated using commutation properties for Satf. The only nontrivial case is that of the existential quantifier in front of CI, that is, when the inference has the form 3x,a(t0 ,..., &_-1,x,) , A"
Then by the induction hypothesis and commutation properties for Satf we know that either Sat/('a(ta,.
. . , &,_I, t,,,)', ()) or Satf( 'V A", ( )) holds. Suppose Sat,fFa(fo,.
.
. , t,F, ( )),
then by (20) we obtain Satf( rtll, (evalf(to, ( )), . . . , evalf(t,, ( )))), whence is cut-free provable in T, where o(x,a) is quantifier free. Since T is a purely universal theory, by (formalized) Herbrand's Theorem, as in the proof of Proposition 4.2, we can find a f-term t(a) and a normal derivation of the sequent 3x0... 3x, X(X&..., x,), a(t(a),a). By Lemma 7.3 we may conclude that, for all n, Satr(ru(t(a), u)l, (n) ). H ence, there exists a m such that Satf ( 'a(x, a)', (m, n) ), because for m one can take the value oft, eval,-(rtl, (n)). Lemma 7.2 then yields 3y a(y, n) . 0
Since uniform fl2 and Ci reflection principles over T are equivalent, we obtain the following important corollary.
Corollary 1.4. For II2 axiomatized theories T containing EA,
This corollary allows to extend to Ci-IR all the facts concerning axiomatizability that we have obtained earlier for lI2 induction rule. It should be stressed, however, that these results only apply for li'2 axiomatized theories, rather than for general 17s axiomatized, as in the case of ZI2-IR.
On the other hand, the transparent analysis of p. Proof. This follows from the well-known fact (cf. e.g. [15] ) that classes of the Grzegorczyk hierarchy are obtained from 6 by iterated application of the operator of primitive recursion, which corresponds to Ci-IR by Corollary 4.7. 0
Relativization
Our goal here is to restate Theorem 2 for a language with additional function symbols. Let rc(x) be a function. Relativized analogues of classes of functions considered in the proof of Theorem 2 are defined as follows. Relativized version of Kalmar elementary arithmetic, EA", is a theory formulated in the language with a function symbol for K. In addition to the usual axioms of EA it has a schema of induction for do(k) formulas. This formulation of EAK is not purely universal because of the presence of bounded quantifiers. We show how to reformulate it in a purely universal way.
First of all, we show that one can naturally do(rc) define the graph of E and prove in EAK that this relation defines a total function. For example, one can first define an auxiliary function t(x) by
t(x) := p.zdx Vi<x K(i)<K(z).
The graph of t is clearly do(~), and since t(x)<x holds provably in EA", the totality of t is easily proved by do ( The following two useful properties of the function Ic are obviously provable in EAK. 1. Vx (k(x) f Seq A lh(r+)) = x + 1 ),
VX, y (x< y -+ E(X) = Z(y) lx).
In particular, the second property shows that E is a provably increasing function. By Proposition 5.11 we know that for such functions da(E) induction is reducible (over EA) to induction for predicates elementary in the graph of II, i.e., for formulas built up from E(X) = y and elementary ones using boolean connectives and quantifiers bounded by elementary functions. Since the graph of E is do(~), we see that do(K) induction schema is available in EAK.
On the other hand, let EA" be a theory formulated in the language of EA enriched by a function symbol for Ic. Axioms of EA" are those of EA plus induction schema for open formulas plus formulas 1 and 2 above. We have just seen that it is contained, or rather interpreted, in EA". The opposite containment is also true. Notice that any two terms satisfying the above equations are provably equal in EA". We shall denote G(x,a) by xi_ g (i,a) . A similar lemma holds for bounded multiplication. However, the proof of the implication vx~yX#(x,a)=O+ c x+&a) = 0, Now we can formulate a relativized version of (a particular case of) Theorem 2.
Lemma 8.3. For every do(K) formula &a) there is a term x$(a) such that EA" k t'x (d(x) H x@(x) = 0).
Theorem 3. Let T be a jnite l7q axiomatized theory. Then [EA' + T, Cf-IR] k RFN,;(T).
Proof. We check that everything in the proof of Theorem 2 relativizes. (Notice that the relativized theorem is formulated in such a way that finite axiomatizability of EA' is not presumed.) We take a purely universal formulation of EA" and introduce a new function symbol f for the standard witness of the (single) The proof of this proposition goes as before, using the fact that 2 is provably increasing in EA', and that the induction schema for da(E) formulas is available in EA'. (It can also be inferred just as a corollary of Proposition 5.11 for a language with the two monotonic function symbols.)
The rest of the proof needs little checking. The evaluation function gives rise to a natural satisfaction predicate in [EA" + T, C;-IR] for quantifier free formulas of r, Sat$e,x).
Tarski commutation conditions directly follow from the commutation properties of evalF(e,x), as before, and we arrive at a relativized version of Lemma 7.3. Here we essentially only rely on the fact that T is a finite and purely universal theory, Tarski commutation properties for SatT(e,x), and the availability of Ao(evalT) induction schema. Theorem 3 follows from this lemma in the usual way. 0 Remark 8.9. Obviously, the analog of Theorem 3 also holds for extensions of the language of arithmetic by more than one additional function symbol I;-.
Z;, induction rule
In this section we generalize the results of Section 7 to C,-IR for an arbitrary n > 1.
Our main result is formulated as follows. After the first application of C,,+i-IR we obtain a theory which is a Cnfz U Ii',,+2 axiomatized extension of IZ,. So, the second claim of the corollary follows by To this end, first we introduce Skolem functions in order to eat up the innermost universal quantifiers in r and 4, i.e., new function symbols rc(x) and v(x) together with the following axioms:
vu 6x [3u T#h)((u)o, u, (U)l > + 3u 6 @I +o((~)o~ fJ> (U)l 11.
(26)
Let U be a theory obtained by adding to EAK,' axioms (25) and (26). Obviously, U has a IIF' axiomatization.
Lemma 9.4. There is a non-relatiuizing interpretation (.)-of U in IZl such that (a) (.)-is identical on formulas in the language of EA; (b) If A E CF' then (A)-is equiualent to a & formula in ICI.
Proof. Graph of the function v will be defined by a formula v(x) = y naturally expressing that y is the least z such that
Notice that this formula is de(Ci). To show that ZZi proves Vx3!y v(x) = y we make use of the fact (cf. [4, p. 691) An obvious corollary of Lemma 9.4 is the fact that U is conservative over ICI, and this fact can be seen to be provable in EA. (A careful reader may notice that below we only need to interpret a finite fragment of U, and for finite theories such a formalization is immediate.) Now we observe that the function v'(u,u) := pzZv ((u,u) ). -0(&&z) is elementary in v, and therefore can be defined by a term in EA",'. By axiom (25) we may then infer that U proves
Let Tf be a theory in the language of U obtained by adding to U the axiom r, that is, Tf := U + z. By (28), Tf has a @' axiomatization. Besides, since T = EA + z contains ICI, T+ is a (provably) conservative extension of T. Indeed, for any formula A in the language of T, T+ FA implies U I-z +A, whence IZ, k z+A and T t-A, by Lemma 9.4. Reasoning in a similar way, we obtain a term K'(u,x) of EAc," such that
Since Tf is a provably conservative extension of T, this yields EA t Provr+(r3u&, (u, rc'(u,k) ,i)l) +-+ Provr+(r4(k)1)
H Provr( r@(i)1).
Now we are in a position to invoke Theorem 3. Since T+ is a finite and #'" axiom- 
T++{VxZi(x) 1 i = 1,. . ,k} k VX (Provr(r4(k)1)--+&x)).
Since (. )-, being a non-relativizing interpretation, distributes over boolean connectives and quantifiers, from (31) we obtain C2 formulas Z,-(x), . . . ,Z;(x) such that This completes the proof of the main part of Theorem 4 for n = 1. The other part is no different from that of Theorem 2.
Now we sketch a proof of Theorem 4 for an arbitrary n > 1. We consider the case of even n (the case of odd n is only notationally different). Our proof generalizes the one given for n = 1 fairly straightforwardly, the only problem is not to get confused by various indices of formulas, functions, and variables. Let T be an extension of I&,, with the only non-EA Zlzn+2 axiom r:= vu()3o(JvUi3u, . . ~V'u,ilV" Z~(U&UO,. . . ,u,,u,),
where rc is bounded, and let and similarly for the other functions. Totality of vi and Ki, for i <m, together with the axioms $i and Bi then follows from the strong Ci collection schema, which is available in IC, for i <m. Verifying the monotonicity axioms is unproblematic. We define a function v~k+,(z4~,v~, . . . ,24,-k) as fiut ',--k ~~2k+l((~O,~O,...,~,-k) ).~~k (~O,~O,...t~,-k,~,-k). v;~+~ is elementary in VI, ~1,. . . , v2kfl ; hence it can be represented by a term in U2k+t. Besides, since U2kfr contains U2k, we have k H z; k(uO , v; k+@O, . . . , ).
The latter formula is quantifier-free and will be denoted rikfl. Similarly, we define 4k+2 (uo, vo, . . ., OO, . . ., ). lz;k+, (uO, 00,. . . ,%k-1,&-k Now we define T+ := Uzn + r (the language of T+ is that of Uzn). Since T contains IC,, by Lemma 9.6 Tf is a provably conservative extension of T. T+ has a fl: , !?I I . ..> L 60 axiomatization, and 4 is provably equivalent to a C~"l,.
--'v2J8,h-z" formula within T+ by Lemma 9.7 . This allows us to apply Theorem 3 to T+, and to carry through the rest of the proof exactly in the way it was done for the case n=l. 0
On &I(&,) induction rule
We first analyze the induction rule for boolean combinations of Ci formulas.
Proposition 10.1. &J(Zi)-IR 2 Cl-IR.
Proof. We must show that, for every theory T containing EA, 
We must show that VxA(x) is contained in [T, Ci-IR] . It is easy to see by induction on the complexity of boolean combinations that every B(C,) formula is logically equivalent to both a C,,+i and a n,+i formula, that is, is A,+, in EA. In particular, A(x) is A2 and (33) Essentially, the same argument works for !%(C,)-IR, for arbitrary n, only at the last step we have to apply Corollary 9.1 or 9.2. In this way we obtain the following proposition. 
Conclusion
In this paper we introduced natural notions of reducibility and congruence of rules in formal arithmetic.
We classified various forms of induction rules of restricted arithmetical complexity (over EA) modulo congruence relation. It turned out that these forms, most commonly, fall into one of the three main ( I hope the results of this paper will convince the reader of the fact that rules in arithmetic are an interesting independent object of study, and that a detailed analysis how particular rules work not only often reveals peculiar effects, but may have useful applications in other topics of proof theory. 1994. Thanks are due to the Logic Group of the Department of Philosophy for providing an excellent research environment. 
